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ORDEAL BY INNOCENCE: WHY THERE SHOULD BE 
A WRONGFUL INCARCERATION/EXECUTION 
EXCEPTION TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Colin Miller* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two recent 60 Minutes stories have shed light on a dilemma that pre-
viously remained in the shadows for years, much like the innocent men it 
affected.  In 1982, Alton Logan was convicted of first degree murder based 
upon being the trigger man in a robbery gone wrong at a Chicagoland 
McDonald‘s.  What the jury that convicted Logan did not hear was that 
another man, Andrew Wilson, confessed to the crime Logan allegedly 
committed.  The problem was that Wilson confessed to his attorneys, public 
defenders Dale Coventry and Jamie Kunz, who confirmed with the relevant 
authorities that they were bound by the rules of professional responsibility 
not to disclose their client‘s confession.  Coventry and Kunz did prepare an 
affidavit detailing Wilson‘s guilt and in fact planned to come forward if 
Logan were given the death penalty.  Ironically, two holdouts on the jury 
seemingly spared Logan‘s life by voting against capital punishment, but in 
fact dealt him the same fate that would befall the affidavit: being locked 
up—Logan in a prison cell; the affidavit in a lock box.  Pained by guilt, the 
public defenders convinced Wilson to allow them to reveal his guilt after 
his death, resulting in Logan‘s eventual release from prison twenty-six 
years after he entered.1 
A similar disposition still eludes Lee Wayne Hunt.  Hunt and Jerry 
Cashwell were convicted in 1986 of murdering Lisa and Roland ―Tadpole‖ 
Matthews in North Carolina based in part upon an FBI lead bullet analysis, 
which has since been found unreliable and potentially misleading.  While 
the jurors who sentenced Hunt to two life sentences plus twenty years im-
prisonment heard this questionable evidence, they did not hear that Cash-
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  Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; Blog Editor, EvidenceProf Blog 
(http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/).  I would like to thank my wife Zoe for her support 
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1
  See 60 Minutes: 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison (CBS television broadcast Mar. 9, 
2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/06/60minutes/main3914719.shtml (last 
updated May 23, 2008) (link). 
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well confessed to being the sole killer to his attorney, appellate public de-
fender Staples Hughes, in 1986.  As in the Logan case, Hughes kept the 
confession under wraps until Cashwell‘s death.  Unlike Coventry and Kunz, 
however, Hughes did not procure his client‘s consent to disclose the confes-
sion after Cashwell‘s death and had a disciplinary complaint leveled against 
him.  Whereas the North Carolina State Bar dismissed the complaint against 
Hughes after a protracted investigation, Hunt remains in the Johnson Cor-
rectional Institute after the Supreme Court of North Carolina recently re-
fused to hear his appeal without explanation.2 
While the nationwide attention given to these cases is new, the dilem-
ma they present is not.  There are manifold examples of attorneys keeping 
proverbial smoking guns locked away while prison bars do the same to in-
nocent men, but perhaps the most (in)famous is the case of George Reiss-
felder.  In 1967, Reissfelder and William Sullivan were convicted of first 
degree murder and armed robbery in connection with a payroll holdup in 
Boston.  Years later, as Sullivan was on his deathbed, he confessed to a 
jailhouse priest that Reissfelder was not involved in the holdup.  Reissfeld-
er‘s court-appointed attorney, Roanne Sragow, and her associate, future 
Presidential candidate John Kerry, later uncovered that Sullivan previously 
made a similar confession to his attorney, who felt duty bound to keep si-
lent for over a decade.  Indeed, even after Sragow and Kerry moved to re-
lease Sullivan‘s former attorney from his obligation of confidentiality, the 
judge denied the motion, and it took a waiver from Sullivan‘s family before 
Reissfelder was freed from the cell at Walpole State Prison that housed him 
for fifteen years.3   
How do these injustices occur?  Until recently, the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility prohibited an attorney from disclosing client in-
formation relating to a completed crime in which the attorney‘s services 
were not used, meaning that an attorney could not disclose that his client 
committed a crime for which another man was charged or convicted.  And 
while the ABA amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002 to permit attorneys 
to reveal client information to prevent ―reasonably certain death or substan-
 
 
 
2
  See State v. Hunt, 659 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 2008); John Solomon, The End of a Failed Technique—But 
Not of a Prison Sentence, Silent Injustice (Nov. 18, 2007), http://truthinjustice.org/lee-wayne-hunt.htm 
(link). 
3
  See John Vennochi & Diane Lewis, Cleared of Murder Charge, He Wants to Forget the Past, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 1982, at 40, available at http://www.nodp.org/ma/stacks/g_reissfelder.html 
(link); Gilda M. Tuoni, Society Versus the Lawyers: The Strange Hierarchy of of Protections of the 
“New” Client Confidentiality, 8 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 439, 471 (1993). The thirteen year 
wrongful incarcerations of Jose Morales and Ruben Montalvo in New York for a murder committed by 
Jesus Fornes were strikingly similar, with Fornes‘ legal aid attorney and priest not coming forward with 
word of Fornes‘ confession until after his death.  See Jim Dwyer, In Court, a Priest Reveals a Secret He 
Carried for 12 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at B1, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990DE7DE1E3BF934A25754C0A9679C8B63 (link). 
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tial bodily harm,‖4 the few commentators to address the issue have curtly 
concluded that this exception would still not apply to the wrongful incarce-
ration scenario presented by the preceding examples.5  Conversely, Massa-
chusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) explicitly permits attorneys 
to disclose client information to, inter alia, ―prevent the wrongful execution 
or incarceration of another.‖6  This Essay argues that the twenty-six states 
that have adopted some form of amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) can and 
should read an implied wrongful incarceration/execution exception into 
their existing rules while the remaining twenty-three states (and the District 
of Columbia) that have not adopted some form of amended Model Rule 
1.6(b)(1) should amend their rules to create such an exception and can do so 
while causing less violence to the rationales behind attorney-client confi-
dentiality than existing exceptions. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
1.6(B)(1) 
The idea of allowing or requiring attorneys to disclose client informa-
tion to prevent the wrongful incarceration or execution of another is not 
new.  In 1979, the ABA‘s Kutak Commission prepared a discussion draft of 
the new proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provided, in 
relevant part, that a lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the 
extent ―necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would 
seriously endanger the life or safety of a person, result in the wrongful de-
tention or incarceration of a person or wrongful destruction of substantial 
property or corrupt judicial or governmental procedure.‖7  
After this draft provoked significant controversy, the Commission al-
tered its language and proffered a Proposed Final Draft Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 
1981, which stated that ―[a] lawyer may reveal information to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from commit-
ting a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in 
 
 
 
4
  MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007), available at  
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html (last visited June 17, 2008) (―A lawyer may reveal in-
formation relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary 
. . . to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.‖) (link). 
5
  Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 
519 (2002) (link). 
6
  See MASS. RULES PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc1.htm#Rule%201.6 (last visited June 17, 2008) (―A lawyer may reveal 
. . . [confidential information relating to the representation of a client] . . . to prevent the commission of a 
criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial 
bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another, or to prevent the 
wrongful execution or incarceration of another.‖) (emphasis added) (link). 
7
  See Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin Fran-
kel’s Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 631 n.99 (2005) 
(link). 
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death or substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of another.‖8  In 1983, however, the American College of 
Trial Lawyers offered an amendment to remove the portion of the exception 
covering fraudulent acts, restricting the class of disclosable criminal acts.  
The amendment was adopted, and the enacted Rule 1.6(b)(1) indicated that 
―[a] lawyer may reveal information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal act 
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm.‖9 
Rule 1.6(b)(1) thus stood as one of several exceptions to the general 
principle of confidentiality contained in Rule 1.6(a), under which ―[a] law-
yer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client un-
less the client gives informed consent.‖10  Like the similar confidentiality 
rules for the doctor-patient and clergyperson-penitent relationships, attor-
ney-client confidentiality has been viewed as essential to the development 
of client trust and the facilitation of open and honest communication in the 
rendering of services.11  The 1983 version of the Model Rule remained unal-
tered until the ABA Ethics Commission 2000 suggested removal of the ―fu-
ture criminal act‖ and imminence requirements from Rule 1.6(b)(1).  The 
ABA accepted this recommendation and amended Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002 so 
that ―[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.‖12  Comment 6 to the 
rule explains the import of this change.  Previously, an attorney could not 
disclose any past (non-attorney facilitated) act of a client and could not dis-
close any proposed future act unless it was criminal and likely to cause im-
minent death or substantial bodily harm.  Under the amended rule, however, 
attorneys may disclose even past non-criminal acts by clients or third par-
ties when death or substantial bodily harm is ―reasonably certain.‖13 
According to Comment 6,  
[s]uch harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or 
if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at 
a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. 
Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste 
 
 
 
8
  Patrick T. Casey & Richard S. Dennison, The Revision to ABA Rule 1.6 and the Conflicting Duties 
of the Lawyer to Both the Client and Society, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 569, 570 (2003), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3975/is_200307/ai_n9259205 (link). 
9
  Id. (emphasis added). 
10
  MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html (last visited June 17, 2008) (link). 
11
  See Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who 
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 97 (1994) (link). 
12
  MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html (last visited June 17, 2008) (link). 
13
  See Stephen D. Easton, My Last Lecture, 56 S.C. L. REV. 229, 253 n.60 (2004). 
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into a town‘s water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if 
there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will 
contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer‘s disclosure is 
necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.14 
This comment indicates that ―[s]uch harm‖ is ―reasonably certain‖ when it 
is either ―imminent‖ (i.e., temporally close) or when failure to disclose will 
irreversibly set into motion a chain of events that could end in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm. 
As the attached Appendix indicates, twenty-six states have adopted 
some version of amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) while twenty-three states 
and D.C. still have Rules that only permit or require attorney disclosures to 
prevent future criminal (and sometimes fraudulent) conduct.  Only five 
states still have an ―imminence‖ requirement, and eleven states have 
adopted some form of the 1981 Proposed Final Draft Rule 1.6(b)(1) and 
permit or require attorneys to disclose client information to prevent fraudu-
lent acts, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another, 
or both. 
Only one state, however, has adopted some version of the 1979 discus-
sion draft.  Perhaps guided by its experience with George Reissfelder, Mas-
sachusetts has a version of Rule 1.6(b)(1) which permits a lawyer to 
disclose client information ―to prevent the commission of a criminal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death 
or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests 
or property of another, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarcera-
tion of another.‖15 
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF A WRONGFUL 
INCARCERATION/EXECUTION EXCEPTION 
A. States Adopting Some Version of Amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) Can 
Read a Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception Into Their Existing 
Rules 
After the ABA amended Rule 1.6(b)(1), few commentators addressed 
the issue of whether the amended rule now permitted attorneys to disclose 
client information to prevent the wrongful execution of another person.  
Those that did merely mentioned in passing and without much explication 
that they thought that the amended rule now permitted such disclosure.16  
This position appears correct because disclosure would prevent death, but at 
 
 
 
14
  MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6_comm.html (last visited June 17, 2008) (link). 
15
  MASS. RULE OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008), available at  
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc1.htm#Rule%201.6 (last visited June 17, 2008) (emphasis added) 
(link). 
16
  See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 5, at 518–19. 
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what point would such death be reasonably certain?  These commentators 
claimed that under the amended rule, an attorney could not disclose client 
information until ―all appeals have been exhausted and an execution date 
scheduled.‖17 
This position again seems close to the mark because the low percen-
tage of inmates sentenced to capital punishment who are actually executed 
indicates that the death to be prevented is not ―reasonably certain.‖18  Ap-
plying the two definitions of ―reasonably certain‖ laid out in Comment 6, 
we first see that death is not necessarily ―imminent‖ until a death sentenced 
prisoner has been incarcerated for many years because the extensive appel-
late process has made it so that ―the average length of time from sentence to 
execution is over twelve years . . . .‖19  Second, until a death sentenced pris-
oner has lost his terminal appeal (or even later, based upon the possibility 
of, inter alia, a stay of execution or clemency), there is little risk that an at-
torney‘s failure to act will irreversibly set into motion a chain of events that 
could end in death.  This means that innocent men and women could sit in 
prison cells for decades while attorneys, like the convicted, are bound to 
bide their time. 
How, then, do we avoid the ―justice delayed is justice denied‖ conun-
drum, and what of innocent men such as Alton Logan, who are spared from 
the death penalty?  My proposed solution is to construe wrongful incarcera-
tion as reasonably certain substantial bodily harm.  In contrast, the few 
commentators to address the issue thus far have curtly concluded that, at 
best, the amended rule only covers wrongful convictions punctuated by ex-
ecution.20 
To determine whether or not wrongful incarceration should allow for 
disclosure under the rule, we must consider the typical acts that attorneys, 
the ABA, and states have concluded are likely or reasonably certain to re-
sult in substantial bodily harm.  Leslie Levin‘s one of a kind 1993 survey of 
New Jersey lawyers revealed that since January 1985, 67 out of 776 res-
ponders had encountered at least one occasion in which they reasonably be-
lieved that a client was going to commit a specific wrongful act that was 
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, with by far the most 
common act being assault and battery.21  As the aforementioned Comment 6 
indicates, an act that will potentially result in innocent third parties con-
tracting a disease is another act that could result in substantial bodily harm.  
 
 
 
17
  Id. at 519; see also, e.g., David W. Raack, The Ethics Commission’s Proposed Revisions to the 
Model Rules: Substantive Change or Just a Makeover?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 233, 239 (2001). 
18
  Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, 
and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 319 (2003) (―At the end of 1997 there were 3,335 inmates 
under a sentence of death, meaning that approximately 2% of those on death row were executed.‖). 
19
  Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal Sanction and “Closure” for 
Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 387 (2007) (link). 
20
  See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 16, at 519. 
21
  See Levin, supra note 11, at 112. 
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Clearly forcible rape is another act that could result in substantial bodily 
harm, and Massachusetts has indicated in Comment 9A to its Rule 1.6 that 
statutory rape is an act that causes substantial bodily harm.22 
Turning to wrongful incarceration, arguably, inmates are exposed to 
the risk of substantial bodily harm inherent in each of these three acts.  
First, in comparison to the non-incarcerated, inmates face an increased risk 
of physical violence based upon factors such as the concentration of violent 
individuals, overcrowding, prison culture, the inability of prisoners to phys-
ically separate themselves, the prevalence of drug use, and prison guard 
brutality.23  One national study indicated that twenty-seven percent of in-
mates will suffer from a physically violent attack, excluding rape, while da-
ta from a Pontiac Correctional Institute report indicated that in Illinois in 
1990 there were 588 assaults in a prison population of 1,924 inmates (31%); 
furthermore, both the study and report likely underestimate the problem 
based upon the ―inmate norm against snitching and possible retaliation.‖24 
Second, inmates experience heightened rates of communicable diseas-
es contracted vis a vis the general population, perhaps explained by prison 
overcrowding (and prisoners accordingly living in close quarters) and com-
pounded by generally poor medical screening and treatment in prisons.25  
According to a 2002 study by the National Commission on Correctional 
Health Care, the rates of HIV and Hepatitis C infections in prison are more 
than five times and between nine and ten times the corresponding rates in 
the general population, respectively.26  And while incomplete reporting 
makes it impossible to determine the exact number of inmates who already 
had diseases before being incarcerated, it is known that many inmates do 
not contract communicable diseases until after they are imprisoned, in large 
part based upon same sex rape.27  This leads to the third point, which is the 
 
 
 
22
  MASS. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 9A (2008), available at  
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc1.htm#Rule%201.6 (last visited June 17, 2008) (link) [hereinafter 
Comment 9A]. 
23
  See Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for Punishment, 34 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 443, 462–65 (1993). 
24
  Id. at 462 n.126; see also James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States 
Prisons: Sexual Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) (link). 
25
  See Potts, supra note 23, at 465–70; Prison Rape Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 
30 (2003) (statement of Frank A. Hall, Director, The Eagle Group) (―In 2001, more than six percent of 
all deaths in these institutions were attributable to these life-threatening illnesses.  Infection rates for 
other sexually transmitted diseases, tuberculosis, and hepatitis B and C are also far greater for prisoners 
than the American population as a whole. Prison rape is often a death sentence for the victim.‖). 
26
  See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED 
INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, VOL. 1, at 18 (2002), available at 
http://www.ncchc.org/stbr/Volume1/Chapter3.pdf (noting that 17–18.6% of  prisoners have Hepatitis C 
while only 1.8% of the general population has the disease) (link). 
27
  See Rachel Wyatt, Note, Male Rape in U.S. Prisons: Are Conjugal Visits the Answer?, 37 CASE 
W. RES. J. I‘NTL L. 579, 590 (2006) (link). 
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consensus that inmates are subjected to an increased risk of same sex rape, 
with one study revealing that 98% of an inmate sample was aware of at 
least one sexual assault occurring in the previous year.28 
In deciding whether the increased risk of a prisoner suffering from any 
one of these three harms constitutes reasonably certain bodily harm, we 
must ask whether the increased risk is commensurate with the risks faced 
by intended victims in situations where we permit Rule 1.6(b)(1) disclo-
sures.  Taking the most typical situation, if we believe that the risk of an in-
tended assault and battery victim actually suffering from substantial bodily 
harm is analogous to the aggregate increased risk of a prisoner suffering 
from violence, contracting a communicable disease, or being raped, disclo-
sure should be permitted or required in the wrongful incarceration scenario.  
The statistics recounted in the previous paragraphs strongly indicate that 
this is the case, which is borne out by the fact that 52 out of the 67 respond-
ers in Levin‘s survey who believed that their clients were going to commit 
specific wrongful acts likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm 
had at least one client who did not ultimately commit the proposed acts.29  
The advantage of having not only a wrongful execution exception but 
also a wrongful incarceration exception is it would apply to a broader range 
of cases and allow for swifter justice in death penalty cases.  Comment 9A 
to Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 indicates that the rule al-
lows an attorney ―to reveal client information in the specific situation where 
such information discloses that an innocent person has been convicted of a 
crime and has been sentenced to imprisonment or execution.‖30  Going fur-
ther, because of the large percentage of defendants detained at some point 
during the pre-trial period,31 attorneys should frequently be able to disclose 
client information before a trial has even begun.  In either of these cases, in-
carceration would be inevitable, making the risk of substantial bodily harm 
connected with such incarceration ―reasonably certain‖ under both of the 
definitions laid out in Comment 6.  Accordingly, states that have adopted 
some form of amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) can and should read a similar 
wrongful incarceration/execution exception into their existing rules. 
Moreover, the states that have amended their rules to permit or require 
attorneys to disclose client information to prevent substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of another can include the significant financial 
 
 
 
28
  Potts, supra note 23, at 471 n.185; see also Cheryl Bell et al., Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the 
Prison System: Analyzing America’s Most “Open” Secret, 18 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 195, 198 (2000) 
(―Don Lockwood‘s 1986 study of New York state prison inmates revealed that 22% of these maximum-
security prisoners had been the victims of attempts to coerce them into a sexual act, compared to 23% in 
the Struckman-Johnson study.‖) (link). 
29
  See Levin, supra note 11, at 111–12, 114 n.145. 
30
  Comment 9A, supra note 22. 
31
  During fiscal-year 2001, approximately 72% of federal defendants were detained pre-trial.  See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 414–15 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t513.pdf (link). 
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effects of imprisonment as part of the harm to be prevented by a wrongful 
incarceration/execution exception.32  Thus, as long as wrongful incarcera-
tion satisfies the substantial bodily harm or financial harm requirement, 
states with ―future criminal act‖ requirements should be able to create 
wrongful incarceration/execution exceptions.  Indeed, as the next section 
shows, a wrongful incarceration/execution exception upsets that the ratio-
nales behind attorney-client confidentiality less than the existing ―future 
criminal acts‖ exception. 
B. States Not Adopting Some Version of Amended Rule 1.6(b) Should 
Create a Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception Because It Would Be 
Consistent with the Rationales Behind “Future Criminal Act” Requirements 
At first blush, it may seem a radical departure from the status quo to 
propose that states, which have not adopted the ABA‘s 2002 amendment to 
Rule 1.6(b)(1), should add an exception allowing attorney‘s to break confi-
dentiality in order to prevent wrongful incarceration.  By their language, 
these states‘ rules currently allow attorneys to disclose only future criminal 
acts by defendants, and therefore not simply failure to confess to a crime.  
But what is the purpose of the ―future criminal act‖ requirement? 
In order to justify breaking a client‘s confidence, there must be a suffi-
cient countervailing interest outweighing the interests that attorney-client 
confidentiality advances—the ―future criminal act‖ requirement creates 
such sufficiency by demanding criminal culpability and preventable peril.33  
In other words, when a client relays to his attorney a proposed negligent but 
non-criminal act (such as manufacturing an unsafe toy), Rule 1.6(b)(1) does 
not apply because the client does not intend to engage in sufficiently 
blameworthy behavior.  Meanwhile, when a client informs his attorney that 
he has already committed a crime, Rule 1.6(b)(1) does not permit disclosure 
because the harm has already occurred and is non-preventable. 
Cases involving wrongful incarceration or execution, on the other 
hand, satisfy both of these requirements.  When a client confesses in confi-
dence to a crime for which another has been convicted, that confession it-
self is evidence of criminal culpability.  There is also a preventable harm 
because, by breaking confidence and revealing the client‘s confession, the 
attorney may be able to stop a wrongful incarceration or execution.  Indeed, 
 
 
 
32
  Frontline: Burden of Innocence: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/etc/faqsreal.html (May 1, 2003) (―Studies by 
the Life After Exoneration Project found that over 90 percent of exonerees lost all their assets—savings, 
vehicles, houses—while imprisoned.‖) (link). 
33
  See Irma S. Russell, Unreasonable Risk: Model Rule 1.6, Environmental Hazards, and Positive 
Law, 55 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 117, 169 (1998) (link); Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environ-
mental Hazards, Model Rule 1.6, and the Attorney’s Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. 
L. REV. 409, 462 (1997) [hereinafter Russell, Cries and Whispers] (Rule 1.6(b)(1) disclosures ―require[] 
two elements: (1) significant peril to a third party . . . and (2) culpable conduct by the client (a criminal 
act).‖). 
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a wrongful incarceration/execution exception arguably fulfils these purpos-
es better than the ―future criminal‖ act exception does. 
Criminal culpability is more certain in wrongful incarcera-
tion/execution cases than in ―future criminal act‖ cases.  Comment 13 to the 
pre-2002 Model Rule 1.6 cautioned that when a client discloses an intention 
to commit a criminal act, ―[i]t is very difficult for a lawyer to ‗know‘ when 
such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have 
a change of mind.‖34  Still, the rule allows an attorney to make a Rule 
1.6(b)(1) disclosure despite the fact that his client may never have acted 
upon his ―heinous purpose.‖  Conversely, in the case of wrongful incarcera-
tion/execution there is no risk of a change of mind; the crime has already 
been committed.  Thus, a wrongful incarceration/execution exception is ar-
guably more justifiable than the ―future criminal act‖ exception. 
There is also a stronger guarantee of preventable harm in wrongful in-
carceration/execution cases than in ―future criminal act‖ cases.  A client 
disclosing an intention to commit a crime might never have successfully 
completed that crime and thus there would be no actual peril to prevent in 
some ―future criminal act‖ cases.  On the other hand, in the proposed 
wrongful incarceration/execution scenario, an attorney would not be permit-
ted or required to disclose client information until after the wrong person 
has been sentenced or incarcerated, meaning that there will always be a pe-
ril to prevent or correct. 
III. A WRONGFUL INCARCERATION/EXECUTION EXCEPTION WOULD 
NOT UNDULY HINDER THE RENDERING OF LEGAL SERVICES 
One might argue that a wrongful incarceration/execution exception 
would chill the client trust and communication that attorney-client confi-
dentiality is intended to preserve.  Such concern, however, is unfounded.  
―[T]here is no evidence that clients are discouraged from talking to their 
lawyers as a result of exceptions to confidentiality rules,‖35 because for bet-
ter or for worse, most laypeople believe that attorney-client communica-
tions are more protected than they are.  One might further argue that the 
current exceptions, which seemingly do not affect client decision-making, 
are somehow different than a wrongful incarceration/execution exception, 
which, in contrast and if implemented, would hinder the rendering of legal 
advice.  The argument actually cuts the other way. 
The long standing ―future criminal act‖ confidentiality exception typi-
cally involves an attorney disclosing client information used in rendering 
legal advice.  To wit, the survey results from Leslie Levin‘s aforementioned 
survey of New Jersey lawyers revealed that 92.4% of responders who be-
lieved that their clients were going to commit wrongful acts that were likely 
 
 
 
34
  Russell, Cries and Whispers, supra note 33, at 431 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6 cmt. 13 (1994)). 
35
  Levin, supra note 11, at 98. 
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to cause substantial bodily harm discussed this belief with their clients, with 
96.7% of that group discussing the legal consequences of the act.36  Fur-
thermore, existing exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality that allow an 
attorney to prevent, mitigate, or rectify certain acts or their consequences, 
when a client used the attorney‘s services to commit the act, by definition 
involve an attorney disclosing statements made by his client for the purpose 
of receiving legal advice.37  Similarly, the existing exception that allows an 
attorney to disclose client information to, inter alia, ―respond to allegations 
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer‘s representation of the client‖ also 
by definition allows an attorney to disclose statements made by his client 
for the purpose of receiving legal advice.38  For each of these situations, 
breaking client confidence is allowable on information obtained for the pur-
pose of rendering legal advice. 
By contrast, the client information at issue under a wrongful incarcera-
tion/execution exception frequently will not come from the client for the 
purpose of receiving legal advice and will not result in such advice.  For ex-
ample, Andrew Wilson, the confessing client in the Alton Logan case, was 
not pursued as a suspect in the McDonald‘s robbery/shooting and bragged 
to his public defenders (who were representing him in an unrelated matter) 
about his undetected commission of the crime rather than seeking advice 
about how to defend himself.  In these cases, my proposed exception would 
do little to hinder the rendering of legal advice and would certainly do less 
harm than existing exceptions. 
On the other hand, if the information to be disclosed in a wrongful in-
carceration/execution case did come from the client for the purpose of re-
ceiving legal advice, like in the Lee Wayne Hunt case, the confessing client 
will be a co-defendant, and disclosure would likely impede the rendering of 
legal advice.  While this might seem to argue against the use of such an ex-
ception, addition of a wrongful incarceration/execution exception would 
likely have little or no impact on a client‘s willingness to speak with his at-
torney.  Clients unaware of the exceptions would certainly not be affected 
by an exception they do not know exists.  Clients who are aware of the ex-
ceptions to attorney-client confidentiality already have good reason not to 
admit to a crime for which another person has been charged or convicted.  
Thus, the argument that adding a wrongful incarceration/execution excep-
tion would chill trust and communication between attorney and client is un-
founded. 
For example, pursuant to Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 
1.2(d),39 an attorney shall not, among other things, assist a client in conduct 
 
 
 
36
  See id. at 117 & nn.156–57. 
37
  See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_6.html (link).  
38
  See id. R. 1.6(b)(5). 
39
  See id. R. 1.2(d), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_2.html (link). 
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that the attorney knows is criminal or fraudulent, and under Model Rule of 
Professional Responsibility 4.1(b), an attorney shall not knowingly ―fail to 
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to 
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is 
prohibited by Rule 1.6.40 
These rules mean that if Jerry Cashwell wanted to testify that he did 
not kill Lisa and Roland ―Tadpole‖ Matthews or that Lee Wayne Hunt 
committed the crime, his attorney would have needed to prevent him from 
testifying lest he suborn perjury.  If Cashwell nonetheless perjured himself, 
his attorney would have needed to withdraw from representing him and 
may have needed to make a ―noisy withdrawal,‖ under which he would 
have been required to ―give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm 
an opinion, document, affirmation or the like.‖41  Of course, the purpose of 
the ―noisy withdrawal,‖ and its likely collateral effect, is to ―inferentially 
[disclose] client confidences.‖42  Because a client aware of these existing 
exceptions already has reason not to incriminate himself or exculpate his 
co-defendant, there is no reason to believe that a wrongful incarcera-
tion/execution exception would negatively alter the attorney-client dynamic 
in these situations. 
CONCLUSION 
While men such as Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt have endured 
inordinate suffering, perhaps we can derive a quantum of solace from their 
plights if they lead to the recognition of a wrongful incarceration/execution 
exception to attorney-client confidentiality.  That recognition might come in 
the form of states articulating new rationales for the adoption of such an ex-
ception.  This article, however, has laid out a theory under which states that 
have adopted some form of amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) can read a 
wrongful incarceration/execution exception into their existing rules while 
the states that have not adopted some form of amended Model Rule 
1.6(b)(1) can create such an exception while causing less violence to the ra-
tionales behind attorney-client confidentiality than existing exceptions. 
 
 
 
40
  See id. R. 4.1(b), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_1.html (link). 
41
  See id. R. 4.1(b) cmt. 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_1_comm.html (link). 
42
  See Thomas Andrews, The Limits of Confidentiality: Recent Developments in the United States 
Relating to a Lawyer’s Right to Disclose Confidences to Prevent Property Damage and Fraud, 21 
RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 19, 25 (2004) (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 92–366), available at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/journals/RitsLRev/2004/2.pdf (link). 
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APPENDIX 
A. States Adopting Some Version of Amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) 
Colorado  
Delaware  
Florida  
Georgia (also has a financial harm exception) 
Idaho 
Illinois  
Indiana 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire (exception also covers financial harm) 
North Carolina 
North Dakota  
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
South Carolina 
Utah 
Washington  
Wisconsin (exception also covers financial harm) 
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B. States Which Still Have a “Future Criminal Act” Requirement 
Alabama (has an imminence requirement) 
Alaska (exception also covers fraudulent acts/financial harm/property 
harm) 
Arizona 
Arkansas  
California 
Connecticut (exception also covers fraudulent acts/financial 
harm/property harm) 
D.C. 
Hawaii (exception also covers fraudulent acts/financial harm/property 
harm) 
Kansas 
Kentucky (has an imminence requirement) 
Maine 
Michigan 
Mississippi 
New Jersey (exception also covers fraudulent acts/financial 
harm/property harm) 
New Mexico (exception also covers financial harm) 
New York 
Rhode Island (has an imminence requirement) 
South Dakota (has an imminence requirement) 
Tennessee (exception also covers financial harm/property harm) 
Texas (exception also covers fraudulent acts) 
Vermont (has an imminence requirement) 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Wyoming 
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C. States With a Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception 
Massachusetts (exception also covers fraudulent acts/financial 
harm/property harm) 
 
 
